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This paper looks at leadership characteristics of the Heroic Age explorers 
Gerlache, Drygalski, Nordenskjöld, Charcot, Filchner, Mawson and the better 
known Scott, Shackleton and Amundsen. The creation of heroic images and how 
these change over time is explored and the way different cultural and political 
contexts impacted on the leadership styles of these men.  A description of the 
Antarctic environment at the time, and the resources available to endure its 
hardships, shows the limits to which expedition leaders were tested. Whether 
successful expeditions were due to special leadership characteristics, or other 
qualities such as scientific knowledge and interest, is explored through the 
backgrounds and styles of the nine leaders. Finally, making comparisons 
between these leaders across time and cultural and historic contexts is 
challenged. This is a feature of contemporary management literature, and their 
interpretation of the leadership characteristics and use of examples of Heroic 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
  
The opening up of Antarctica for science and exploration followed the Sixth 
International Geographical Congress in London in 1895. This passed a 
unanimous resolution that the signatory countries (including the major powers 
in Europe) “should do their utmost to conduct scientific exploration of the 
unknown region of Antarctica” (Fiennes 2004: 8). Britain was the leading 
imperial power at the time and persuaded many countries that Antarctica should 
be a priority for new exploration. 
 
There was a “subsequent rash” of national scientific expeditions between 1895 
and 1917. These featured Borchgrevink, Scott and Shackleton (Britain), Gerlache 
(Belgium), Nordenskjöld (Sweden), Charcot (France), Amundsen (Norway), 
Drygalski and Filchner (Germany), Bruce (Scotland), Mawson (Australia) and 
Shirase (Japan) (Headland 2009). These leaders’ expeditions formed the “Heroic 
Age” of Antarctic exploration: a term coined by the British explorer Duncan 
Carse in 1956. Writing in The Times he described Shackleton’s 1916 crossing of 
South Georgia as "three men from the heroic age of Antarctic exploration, with 
50 feet of rope between them, and a carpenter's adze" (Wikipedia.org 2012).  
 
Exploring the unique and extreme Antarctic environment was very challenging 
in the early 1900s and expedition leaders were a mixed lot, with different 
cultural backgrounds, motivations and ambitions. Whether there were special 
characteristics of leadership on which successful expeditions depended, or was 
success due to other qualities such as scientific background and interest, are 
relevant questions, given the way leadership examples from the Heroic Age are 
being used in today’s management literature. The changing images of Heroic Age 
leaders over the past century raises other questions, beyond the scope of this 
paper but being increasingly addressed in the literature (notably Riffenburgh 
1993; Jones 2003, 2011; Barczewski 2007; Larson 2011; also the contribution by 
Solomon, 2001). This is relevant because the cultural context in which we view 
leadership today necessarily influences the way we interpret any lessons from 
the heroic age. 
 
Scott, Shackleton and Amundsen have received the lion’s share of attention in 
literature, film and parlance over the last century. A much wider range of lesser 
known expeditions were successful in their Antarctic quest. These were led by 
men who undertook comparable feats of courage and leadership, but did not 
achieve public acclaim as their objectives did not include the South Pole (Bickel 
1977: 13). Each expedition leader had to manage within the specific paradigm of 
his cultural context and they led in very different styles and ways. These contexts 
would have influenced and even determined particular leadership attributes.  
 
The paper begins with biographical outlines drawing on leadership styles and 
traits of the lesser known leaders Gerlache, Drygalski, Nordenskjöld, Charcot, 
Filchner and Mawson, followed by a section on Scott, Shackleton and Amundsen. 
Commentary follows on the privations these expeditions endured and the risks 
they faced, as context for understanding their leadership qualities. The place of 
science at the time is outlined, because this was also the “Heroic Age of Antarctic 
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science” (Larson 2011). Science was central to the British efforts and the 
international co-operation prevailing in the early Heroic Age expeditions. Other 
motives and perspectives, political and personal, are explored through the 
biographies.  
 
The discussion begins with the way images of heroes are created, which 
inevitably change over time, and the problem this poses for a proper 
understanding of Heroic Age leaders. The management literature draws on 
features of leaders in the Antarctic environment and the way these are applied is 
explored. The problems in making comparisons across different cultural contexts 
and expectations, across time and varying retrospective interpretations, are 
discussed. In drawing these themes to a conclusion the qualities of Heroic Age 
leaders are looked at through the lens of the management literature, to test 
whether there are indeed any “lessons”, or even general characteristics of 
successful leaders in the heroic age of exploration. 
 
 
2. BIOGRAPHICAL OUTLINES 
 
2.1 Adrien de Gerlache (1866-1934) 
 
 Belgian Antarctic Expedition 1897-99 (Belgica) 
 
Even before the Sixth International Geographical Congress in London in 1895, 
Gerlache was organising his own expedition to explore the south. Impetus for the 
Heroic Age of Antarctic exploration came from a lecture given to the Royal 
Geographical Society in London in 1893, by Professor John Murray. He proposed 
that a new Antarctic expedition should be organised to "resolve the outstanding 
geographical questions still posed in the south"(Crane 2005: 75). Gerlaches’s 
preparations were already underway. 
 
There was an uneasy relationship between the Royal Geographical Society and 
the private and commercial expeditions such as that of Gerlache. Contributing to 
this was the fact that British geographical authorities had come to consider polar 
exploration their exclusive province and national pride was dented when 
explorers from other nations delivered results. The eccentric Anglo-Norwegian 
explorer, Carsten Borchgrevink, was snubbed by the British establishment as an 
“arrogant upstart” (Baughman 19); said to be the first to set foot on the Antarctic 
continent itself in 1895 he was certainly the first to overwinter there in 1899. 
The scarcity of funds and their diversion by expeditions such as those of 
Borchgrevink, Gerlache and later, William Bruce (Scotland), were also a concern 
to the Society. (Royal Geographical Society 1995: 344).  
 
Gerlache was a 29 year old naval lieutenant and his main object for the 
expedition was scientific research. Many facets were studied including ice drift 
and collections of geological and zoological specimens. The first annual cycle of 
Antarctic observations were collected and meteorological observations made 
every hour (Hoyer 2000: 77). Large collections of geological and natural history 
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were taken (M 1934: 961) and as part of his exploration of the Peninsula the 
expedition is noted for the discovery and mapping of the Gerlache Strait 
(Headland 2009: 229). 
 
Gaining financial support was a challenge as Belgium’s eyes were on the Congo, 
not the Antarctic, but the Brussels Geographical Society were interested and 
Gerlache managed to raise sufficient funds to embark on the journey through 
public subscription. The men that Gerlache recruited were the most 
international crew of all the Heroic Age expeditions. They included young 
scientists from Rumania , Poland, Belgium, Norway, Russia, and America. The last 
was the doctor Frederick Cook who proved invaluable, as did the young 
Norwegian who joined, Roald Amundsen.  
  
Reaching Antarctic waters late in January 1898, too late in the season, they 
continued charting until March. Gerlache was at cross-purposes with his 
scientists who wanted to remain and investigate the Peninsula region but he 
pressed on to a higher latitude, reaching 71°30'S. The ship Belgica became frozen 
in the pack ice where it drifted in the floe for a year. 
 
They were forced to overwinter, the first to do so within the Antarctic Circle, in 
the Bellingshausen Sea. Preparations for the expedition had not always been 
transparent. The ship was certainly ill-prepared, the provisions unsuited, 
including clothing, lanterns and stoves. Critics have asked if Gerlache intended to 
spend winter below the Antarctic Circle (Reader’s Digest 1985: 131), if so there 
are questions about how well planned it was. Communication with the different 
languages became a problem as the men endured the long night: perpetual cold, 
crowding, illness, despondency and an inadequate diet. This last led to scurvy. 
Gerlache refused to eat fresh seal and penguin meat, even stopping his crew 
doing so, until the doctor Cook induced him to consume it for “medicinal 
purposes” as an example to others (Reader’s Digest 1985: 132). Cook effectively 
assumed command of the Belgica when Gerlache became sick, assisted by 
Amundsen who provided an experienced link between the officers and crew. 
Gerlache strove to ensure the ship was ready to break free from the ice if and 
when the opportunity came, which it did a year after being beset. 
 
There were problems with the expedition even before it reached Antarctic 
waters, some of which reflected the different status between the officers and the 
crew. Such treatment was not unusual then and accounts of these issues at the 
time were more subtle than the pronounced commentary they receive today 
(Hoyer 2000: 77). However, Gerlache may not have taken sufficient care in 
selecting the members of the expedition, and seemed to pay little heed once they 
were recruited. Two of the original crew abandoned the expedition as early as a 
port in Belgium, others in Punta Arenas, which reduced their number to nineteen 
(Reader’s Digest 1985: 131). Some seemed to have little basic seamanship. 
Gerlache’s own account in The Voyage of the Belgica: Fifteen Months in the 
Antarctic (1998) refers to fighting, drunkenness, insubordination and further 
disciplinary problems with men refusing to work when required. 
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Gerlache was a complex character and not a great planner nor a leader, yet he 
was certainly visionary, driven to achieve his own goals, at times perhaps at the 
expense of communicating with his followers. Nevertheless, he achieved his aim: 
his voyage was feted on his return to Europe and considered remarkable. Results 
were what counted and tales of survival against extreme odds. Prior to his 
expedition nothing was known of winter conditions in the Antarctic. This meant 
their meteorological observations were pioneering and important. They had 
made kayaks for local journeys and were the first to use sledges in Antarctica 
(Headland 2009: 229). Gerlache was tenacious in ensuring the collections and 
data were in good condition, and generous in allowing the scientists the credit 
for their work (H.R.M. 1934:  961). 
 
He was married twice, in 1904 and 1919, and had children to both wives. The 
second was a Swedish woman and their son Gaston followed in his father's 
footsteps: in the 1950s he participated in a Belgian research station in 
Antarctica. 
 
2.2 Erich von Drygalski (1865-1949) 
 
German South Polar Expedition 1901–03 (Gauss) 
 
The first German expedition was fully funded by the government, including the 
building of a new ship for the purpose, the Gauss. This was in response to other 
countries’ polar expeditions; Drygalski’s 1899 proposals for the expedition 
prompted this comment from Prince von Arenberg: 
 “the German Reich, with its enormous merchant fleet, and its vast trade network 
which is expanding every day, cannot be shamed into doing nothing” (Drygalski 
1989: iii).  
 
Nationalistic remarks with respect to Antarctic exploration were not confined to 
Germany, and in fact the purposes of the German Expedition were subject to two 
opposing forces. Drygalski’s own were couched essentially in scientific terms, 
covering a wide range of interests; then there was the political dimension, which 
had been important in bringing the expedition to fruition (Drygalski 1989: vii).  
 
Given his capabilities Drygalski was chosen to lead the expedition. What had 
been recognised was  
“the paucity of candidates in Germany suitable for the task of leading an 
expedition, willing to risk everything, absolutely determined, yet of solid 
scientific worth…. He had to prove in addition that he could grasp the scientific 
problems presented by the world of ice, examine them, and show that he could 
then draw conclusions of general validity” (Drygalski 1989: vi). 
 
Drygalski was then 36 years old and a Professor of geography and geophysics at 
the University of Berlin. He had previous polar experience on an expedition to 
Greenland and a good track record of being able to carry out serious scientific 
studies. Previously an assistant at the Geodetic Institute and the Central Office of 
International Geodetics in Berlin, Drygalski had then led two expeditions 
between 1891 and 1893. One of these expeditions overwintered in Western 
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Greenland in 1892-93. 
After exploring the region south of Kerguelen Island and visiting Heard Island 
the expedition ship Gauss was trapped in pack ice about 80 kilometres from 
shore in February 1902 and remained there for over a year. Drygalski and his 
men were to encounter many of the hardships of the Antarctic winter, just as the 
crew of the Belgica before them, however, his ship was adequately supplied and 
very comfortable. By sledge they made the geographical discoveries of Wilhelm 
II Land and Gaussberg. Three ascents by hydrogen balloon were made and 
observations relayed to the ship by telephone; these were also used to indicate 
the most promising route out of the ice that beset the ship. Significant new 
material was brought back from their comprehensive scientific programme and 
Drygalski’s life was dedicated to painstaking preparation of the scientific results 
of his expedition (Drygalski 1989: vi; Ayres 1999: 37; Headland 2009: 233). 
Expectations of Drygalski were high as the British Discovery Expedition had left 
only five days before his ship Gauss. Drygalski’s plan was to have pushed for both 
the geographic and magnetic south poles the following spring; he subsequently 
argued it would have little scientific value, its worth being “purely as a 
spectacular exploit” (Drygalski 1989: vii). The government terminated the 
expedition on its return voyage. Financial support was exhausted and there had 
been little inclination to sink private capital in to the venture. The Kaiser was 
disappointed: politically the expedition was seen as a failure against the 
expectation set for the latitude it might reach (which was 66°40’S, as against 
Scott’s limit of 82°16’S in 1902). It was accepted that  
“in the case of polar expeditions [the public] tends to ask first and foremost what 
latitude was reached” (Drygalski 1989: vii). 
 
At the time, German experience of polar seas was small, and Drygalski was the 
first to investigate the unknown region of eastern Antarctica. A civilian, at times 
seen as a father figure, even officers came to him with their problems. He had a 
feeling for people; while he needed to work within the naval discipline, he had all 
the crew involved in scientific work (not just the scientists) and so the 
interaction among all men worked better. He ensured that all enjoyed good food 
and that there was sufficient for all (Rack 2013). Some were to enlist on the 
second German South Polar Expedition of 1911-12 in the Deutschland under 
Wilhelm Filchner. 
 
However, there was disagreement about the way responsibilities were divided 
between Drygalski and the Captain of the Gauss. When Drygalski concluded a 
second winter in the ice was impracticable, “[t]his disquiet expressed itself 
eventually in what were effectively charges of cowardice and a failure of nerve” 
(Drygalski 1989: iv). Cautious and safety conscious, the first winter on the Gauss 
was adequately provisioned and comfortable. In ordering the return home, 
Drygalski wrote 
“It was a most difficult decision, certainly the most difficult one I had to make, 
but it was necessary. There was no safe place to spend the winter here …” 
(Reader’s Digest: 143). 
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Overall the expedition was considered well-organised and well-equipped 
(Turney 2012: 181). Yet while no expedition was without its mishaps, there 
seemed to be a series of them. There was some profiteering from sale of furs and 
birds from the expedition when they reached South America, which led to 
accusations of unscientific behavior. Drygalski dismissed this as “essentially 
trivial” (Drygalski 1989: 328) even though it reflected poorly on other scientists 
in the expedition. However, there were also ingenious solutions to practical 
problems: using a penguin to run a line from stern to stern of the ship 
underwater; and using dark material and waste to melt the sea ice and assist in 
freeing the ship (Drygalski 1989: x).  
 
Drygalski remarked “there was no high drama, no disasters, no wild successes” 
(Drygalski 1989: xi). Nevertheless, in terms of the expedition being considered a 
failure by some, a reading of his accounts show “in terms of courage, endurance, 
ingenuity and determination as well as in its scientific aspects, that it was not” 
(Drygalski 1989: xi).  
 
Drygalski was known as a dedicated scientist and excellent teacher. Prodigious 
in his research and publications, there is scant reference to a private sphere in 
the literature. In later life Drygalski was a member of many academies, honorary 
member of numerous geographical societies, and recipient of their medals. In 
1944 the Munich Geographical Society, which he had headed for twenty-nine 
years, established the Erich von Drygalski Medal in his honor.  
 
2.3 Otto Nordenskjöld (1869-1928) 
 
Swedish South Polar Expedition 1901-03 (Antarctic) 
 
Nordenskjöld, a professor of Geology, led the non-government Swedish 
expedition of 1901-03. Unlike Scott's and Drygalski's expeditions that were 
government funded, Nordenskjöld’s expedition was entirely dependent on 
private contributions. While it earned lasting fame at home, its huge cost left him 
greatly in debt. He was the first to explore the territories East of Graham Land in 
West Antarctica, doing significant mapping of the Peninsula. 
 
The expedition ship Antarctic was placed under the command of Carl Larsen, an 
experienced Antarctic explorer. The expedition members were marooned in 
three separate parties on different parts of the Peninsula after the sinking of 
their ship Antarctic in the Weddell Sea. The men at Snow Hill Island, Paulet 
Island and Hope bay all suffered danger and hardship throughout a long winter. 
They managed to reunite through a remarkable story of courage and luck, and 
were later rescued by the Argentinian naval vessel Uruguay.  
 
A geologist with wider scientific interests, Nordenskjöld had significant 
experience leading geological expeditions to Tierra del Fuego and the Yukon 
between 1895 and 1898. His polar expedition included seven carefully selected 
scientists, each with specific responsibilities and they produced scientific results 
”arguably the most important from the Antarctic from that date [1903]” 
(Reader’s Digest 1985: 306). Their subsequent output and publications in five 
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languages ensured world-wide relevance of their discoveries and conclusions. 
These provided taxonomies, classifications of ice, glaciers, shorelines, rocks, 
marine life and so on (Elzinga 2006: 149; Cioccale and Rabassa 2006: 122). All 
this was achieved despite losing all their notes and early specimens when the 
ship Antarctic sank. They struggled for 14 days to reach Paulet Island, 40 
kilometres away over shifting sea ice and across open water in a whale boat. 
 
As a Christian Nordenskjöld’s belief in ecumenical co-operation extended to 
science (Elzinga 2006: 143). His decision to share information about his 
observations and specimens with Argentinian institutions (Cioccale and Rabassa 
2006: 125) illustrates his international rather than nationalist focus. A young 
Argentinian Navy Officer joined the expedition crew in Buenos Aires in return for 
food, fuel and help from the Argentinian government (Coolantarctica 2001). A 
further example of Nordenskjöld’s openness and commitment to international 
co-operation was his successful lobbying for a joint Swedish-British expedition 
prior to the First World War. However, by 1919 this had fallen victim to the war 
years and abandoned (Elzinga 2006: 155). 
 
Nordenskjöld rejected the nationalist and imperial rivalry associated with the 
race to the pole, instead “cherishing internationalism and science above national 
prestige and geographic exploits” (Elzinga 2006: 151). He saw “mere exploration 
and the planting of national flags” as a ridiculous venture (Elzinga 2006: 144); to 
him, even geographic discovery was narrow and limited compared with scientific 
research. Given that Shackleton had been close enough on the plateau (180 km) 
to know what the South pole would look like, Nordenskjöld’s priorities were 
such that  
“he found it strange that, when only the aspect of “the record” remained at the 
south pole, then suddenly there was a rush from different quarters to reach the 
mathematical [we might say ”imaginary”] polar point” (Elzinga 2006: 150).  
 
Science was the important thing to Nordenskjöld, and he conducted a 
comprehensive scientific programme which included work in the Falklands, 
South Georgia and Tierra del Fuego. He believed in a science that was 
international and would benefit all mankind regardless of class or nation, and in 
his support of internationalism in polar science he was ahead of his time. He 
tried to promote better organisation and co-ordination of polar research through 
the International Polar Commission in 1905 (Elzinga 2006: 154), however, this 
had ceased to function by around 1916. It was not until 1959 that science was to 
be institutionalised as an international regime, under the Antarctic Treaty. 
 
Nordenskjöld’s focus on science was unencumbered by nationalist interests, 
unlike other expedition leaders of the heroic age. The Swedish government at the 
time did not have ambitions to claim title to Antarctic territory and appeared to 
have no legal analysis of the right to title to territory there (Elzinga et al 2004: 
314-7). The performance of scientific activities would not play a role as a basis of 
the right to participate in the political management of Antarctica until the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty (Elzinga et al 2004: 308). Swedish political interest in Antarctica 
did not develop until the 1970s (Elzinga et al 2004: 320).  
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Their ship Antarctic was placed under the command of Carl Larsen, an 
experienced Antarctic explorer, who proved a strong leader of the ship-wrecked 
party on Paulet Island. Nordenskjöld’s leadership of the expedition received 
criticism from the scientists on the expedition for its poor planning and 
improvisation in research techniques: a more reserved critic said “things could 
have been better” (Elzinga et al 2004: 111). Social relations during the second 
winter were more tense than the first. His failing appeared to be an aversion to 
conflict and not talking about difficulties or resolving them; not the qualities of 
able leadership. Reserved, uncommunicative, even timid were used to describe 
him; understandably, he felt himself to be a lonely figure, aware of his lack of 
success in spite of his preparations and sacrifices (Elzinga et al 2004: 112). 
 
Despite this, Nordenskjöld was concerned for the safety of his men, and made 
balanced judgements: “he wanted to go further but time was short so the ship 
retraced her course” (Reader’s Digest 1985: 152). Many sledging trips were 
made for scientific purpose, with one covering 611 kilometres in 33 days, the 
men returning exhausted. Nordenskjöld decided it was time to turn back when 
they met continued bad weather and bad luck (injury, loss of a tent and the dogs 
finding and eating all their pemmican). 
 
Nordenskjöld came from a tradition of science and learning and a liberal culture 
of education.  He was a complex person with vision, principles and personal 
values, which he acted out in his professional scientific work. His selection of 
men for the expedition was such that they not only succeeded in terms of 
subsequent scientific output, but also survived the duress of two Antarctic 
winters. He was not driven by self or national interests; his primary concern was 
for science (Nordenskjöld: 1905). On his return in 1905 he was appointed 
professor of geography and ethnography at the University of Gothenburg. He 
continued his exploration, to Greenland in 1909 and Chile and Peru in the early 
1920s. 
 
2.4 Jean-Baptiste Charcot (1867-1936) 
 
French Antarctic Expedition 1903-05 (Français) 
French Antarctic Expedition 1908-10 (Pourqoui-Pas?) 
 
Son of a distinguished and brilliant doctor, Charcot had a good education, was 
well travelled and comfortable in society. He followed his father’s expectations 
that he “obtain a noble and eminent position in life, to excel in something” (Oulie 
1938: 15) and became a doctor. However, he felt he was in shadow of his father’s 
reputation: “[a]s a doctor I should never be anything other than the son of the 
great Charcot” (Oulie 1938: 32). On inheriting his father’s fortune he invested it 
in his expeditions, and went to sea. 
 
He distinguished himself as a sailor, declaring he “liked foul weather as it gave 
him the chance to show what he was worth” (Oulie 1938: 37). Impelled to a 
wider destiny, he saw the absence of France among the great expeditions of 
Britain (Scott on the Discovery), Belgium (Gerlache on the Belgica), Germany 
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(Drygalski on the Gauss), Scotland (Bruce on the Scotia) and Sweden 
(Nordenskjöld on the Antarctic).  His motivation was science rather than 
nationalistic pride. Of his ship the Pourqoui-Pas? he wrote: 
“she is ready to take again her mark of interrogation into the region of the 
unknown and to face fatigues and dangers for the honour of French Science” 
(Charcot 1911: 308). 
 
Charcot had met Nordenskjöld and shared his internationalist approach to 
scientific research (Oulie 1938: 66). He described the polar extreme as the great 
equalizer:  
“Beyond the Polar Circle there are no Frenchmen, no Germans, no English, no 
Danes: there are only the people of the Pole, real men.” (Elzinga 2006: 153). 
 
Charcot was thirty when he set off on his first Antarctic Expedition, and had been 
married some seven years, although unhappily, to the granddaughter of Victor 
Hugo. He was to remarry in 1907, his young wife Meg then accompanying him as 
far south as possible on the second expedition. This marriage was conditional on 
Meg not opposing his sea-going journeys; Charcot named Marguerite Bay after 
her (Oulie 1938: 104). He was to have three daughters.  
 
Motivated by the desire to help in the search for Nordenskjöld’s Antarctic, in 
1903 Charcot headed south for Antarctica on the Français. He built huts and 
overwintered at Booth Island on the Peninsula, charting much of the west side of 
the Peninsula while carrying out a scientific programme. His empathy and 
human understanding were illustrated by the personal space all on board the 
ship were given, and his ability to keep morale high through various activities. 
Charcot paid attention to food and his expeditions ate much better than others, 
in typical French style: it was not for them to eat hard-tack. While not French, the 
cook hired in Buenos Aires baked fresh bread every day and cakes and croissants 
on Sundays (Reader’s Digest 1985: 168). Special days were marked with parades 
and masquerades, plays were performed and birthdays celebrated (Charcot 
1911: 158, 206). Charcot was aware that life goes on “at once busy and 
monotonous; and if the months pass quickly, the hours are long” (Charcot 1911: 
209). Much scientific study and surveying was carried out during this first trip, in 
which despite the near shipwreck of the Français, there was no loss of life. 
 
Returning to Antarctica in 1908 on the Pourquoi- Pas?, Charcot led another 
expedition. This also overwintered, undertook extensive work and surveyed two 
thousand more kilometres of coastline including new territory: 
“There I should be able to continue the researches of the Français (themselves 
considered so valuable) in all branches of science, and to verify, complete and 
expand them.” (Charcot 1911: 4-5). 
  
A contemplative man, with a horror of the superficiality of society, he 
nevertheless had a robust personality (Oulie 1938: 51). Refusing to use physical 
discipline on his crew, he instead appealed to their conscience and patriotism to 
“play the game” (Oulie 1938: 67). Animals were not to be killed unnecessarily 
(Oulie 1938: 74, 79), and responsibility for the lives in his care and the risks he 
asked them to face weighed on him: 
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“I had no means of foreseeing, however, what we might discover, and the 
unknown nature of my undertaking when I made a choice of this sector of the 
circle rendered the organization of the expedition all the more difficult, since it 
was necessary to be ready for any emergency and it was impossible, as in the 
case of an attack on familiar ground, to concentrate one’s preparations for a 
struggle against forces which could not be foreseen.” (Charcot 1911: 5). 
 
At a time of doubting his own leadership ability on the voyage of the Français, 
Charcot frankly discussed this with the three most close to him. He also openly 
discussed the risks of their situation with the crew, allowing them to withdraw 
from their contracts should they wish (Oulie 1938: 64). His judgement of risk 
was demonstrated again at the end of the summer of 1908-09, when he decided 
to look for winter quarters: 
“The situation is therefore most grave, and the moment is one of those when the 
responsibility of the head of an expedition is truly agonizing. If our expedition 
were merely one on adventure, aiming simply at beating the record or 
accomplishing a sporting feat, I would gladly take the risk” (Charcot 1911: 131).  
Despite it being a blow to leave the region where he might have accomplished 
more interesting work, and make important sledging excursions, he again called 
his companions together and asked their advice before making this decision. 
 “with anguish of heart … I made up my mind; but really I did not think I had the 
right to cause the Expedition to run such big risks any longer” (Charcot 1911: 
131).  
Such leadership traits earned Charcot loyalty and many of his crew and 
expedition party were to accompany him in later voyages.  
 
Charcot’s work and character were lauded by his peers: Scott called him “the 
gentleman of the Pole” (Reader’s Digest 1985: 173), and Nordenskjöld was 
impressed by his well-planned expedition, presenting him with five Greenland 
huskies. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his courage in the 
British Royal Navy during the First World War. The Polar historian Edwin Balch 
said of Charcot:  
“No-one has surpassed him and few have equalled him as a leader and as a 
scientific observer.” (Reader’s Digest 1985: 173). 
 
Charcot’s aim of getting France to participate in collaborative international Polar 
research was more fully realised in the 1932-33 Polar Year, which he was 
actively involved in planning (Oulie 1938: 196-9). This second Polar Year 
promoted the collective effort on the part of every country interested in scientific 
endeavour, and the principle of planned, prompt and shared publication of 
results (La Cour and Stagg 1933). Like Nordenskjöld, he envisioned science on an 





2.5 Wilhelm Filchner (1877-1957) 
 
German South Polar Expedition 1911-12 (Deutschland) 
 
Filchner was well educated and grew up in Zürich with Liszt as a family friend 
(Reader’s Digest 1985: 304). He joined the Prussian Military Academy as a youth 
and his first expedition was in Russia when he was 21 years old. Sponsored by 
the army, at 23 he did a solo journey on horseback through the Pamir Range of 
central Asia, perhaps a sign of his being a natural loner rather than a suitable 
leader.  
 
He led the second German expedition which reached the head of the unknown 
Weddell Sea. However, it failed in its main purpose which was to cross from the 
Weddell to the Ross Sea. Despite this, discoveries were made  including the 
Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf and important oceanographic data collected from the 
outset, evidence of the circulation of the world’s oceans. 
 
Filchner was a 34 year old lieutenant in the Bavarian army when he led the 
expedition, but none of its members had true polar experience. He gained 
permission from the Kaiser to raise funds through a public lottery, but in the end 
suffered the shortage of funds common to Antarctic expeditions. Filchner had 
worked hard to develop research links and took advice on planning and 
equipment, testing men, equipment and ponies briefly in Spitsbergen (Turney 
2012: 182). He received support from the Berlin Geographical Society whose 
committee took over aspects of the organisation of the expedition, which had 
some detrimental effects. They confused the line of command between Filchner 
and the Captain, Vahsel. He was known to be “trouble” and along with the 
difference in character between the two men, and Vahsel’s advanced syphilis, 
this led to an atmosphere of tension and suspicion (Turney 2012: 185-196). So 
despite being well provisioned and with a sound ship Deutschland, the journey 
was plagued by difficulties of personality, sabotage, suicide, death, fighting and a 
proposed duel (Allen 2012: 1).  
 
Under Maritime Law, The Captain of the Deutschland was in charge of the vessel 
and had control of the lives on board while at sea. Their first winter camp was 
erected on a controversial site, on an iceberg that quickly calved, requiring them 
to winter over in the ship, frozen in and drifting in the pack ice for nine months.  
Filchner had lost control of the leadership of the expedition. The crew split into 
two camps, those loyal to the Captain and those to Filchner. During a three week 
sledging trip the ship drifted 38 miles, challenging Filchner’s party to get back. 
After the death of the Captain, there were disagreements about who would take 
command, fighting and men carrying loaded guns out of fear for their lives. At 
this ignominious end they “all agreed that the less noble aspects of the trip were 
best kept to themselves”, but they remained preserved in diaries (Allen 2012: 3).  
 
Having “had enough of ‘Antarctic Doings’” Filchner never returned and spent his 
life exploring Central and East Asia (Reader’s Digest 1985: 205). 
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2.6 Douglas Mawson (1882-1958) 
 
Australasian Antarctic Expedition 1911-14 (Aurora) 
 
Mawson had been a member of Shackleton’s British Antarctic Expedition in 1907 
(the Nimrod Expedition) and led the Australasian Antarctic Expedition (AAE) of 
1911-14. This undertook extensive scientific programmes with shore parties 
overwintering and conducting sledge journeys. The expedition surveyed and 
mapped the coast and inland territories of Antarctica directly south of Australia. 
It is better known for the Far Eastern Sledging Journey and Mawson’s epic story 
of survival after his two companions, Belgrave Ninnis and Xavier Mertz, died. 
 
In 1908 he was in a party that ascended Mt Erebus and later that year set out on 
a sledging trip to the Magnetic South Pole. Questions were later raised about the 
accuracy of their measurements, and hence that achievement (Ayres 1999: 70). 
During that brutally challenging trip Mawson deposed the Professor (Edgeworth 
David) who was the leader, on account of his unfit state. In a tribute paid on their 
return to Australia, the Professor said 
“Just as Shackleton was the general leader, so … I say that Mawson was the real 
leader and was the soul of our expedition to the magnetic pole. We really have in 
him an Australian Nansen, of infinite resource, splendid physique, astonishing 
indifference to frost.” (Ayres 1999: 29). 
 
By comparison with expeditions only ten years earlier, the AAE was well 
organized and was widely considered to be the most scientific in its planning, 
execution and ambitions (Hains 2002: 44). Mawson was not yet thirty years old. 
His growing knowledge and experience was evident; not only had he been to 
Antarctica with Shackleton, he spent time with other explorers in Europe. He had 
visited Scott and Edward Wilson, scientists associated with Drygalski’s and 
Nordenskjöld’s expeditions in Europe and elicited the help of Charcot and 
Gerlache (Ayres 1999: 31-42, McEwin 2008: 38). 
 
Mawson remained uninfected by Pole fever, seeing “little of scientific value in a 
dash to the Pole” (Ayres 1999: 33), and had declined Scott’s invitation to join his 
expedition. He spent 1910 and some of 1911 working to raise the necessary 
funds for his own, the AAE, in England, Europe and Australia, walking the long 
corridors of influence and money with a determination to win through all  
difficulties. For a man who was to later write in his diary that he was “[m]ost 
humanly lonely in London” (Ayres 1999: 66), this promotion of the expedition 
demonstrated leadership in overcoming obstacles. Fund-raising continued on his 
return where he “appealed to Australia’s growing sense of nationhood: on 
Australia’s doorstep was a vast new southern continent waiting to be 
discovered” (Turney 2012: 214).  
 
Mawson’s AAE ranked among the greatest contributions to science that the Royal 
Geographical Society in London had witnessed (Turney 2012: 255). In the 
context of the internationalism of science, “Ii]t was the AAE that helped establish 
the form that Antarctic science would eventually take” (Riffenburgh 2010: 420). 
Of any expedition so far, Mawson had selected the largest number of scientists 
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(Turney 1912: 210). Mawson always put science first, and he embodied the 
scientific ideal of the expedition, describing his challenge as the leader in a 
private letter: 
”The men were all young and without previous extended field experience and 
that meant the utmost drain on my abilities in order to secure the measure of 
results that accrued.“ (Ayres 1999: 97). 
 
While much had been learnt in the decade or so of polar travel in the region, they 
were still in unexplored territory and chose a very difficult location for their 
main winter quarters. This “windiest spot on earth” was swept by katabatic gales 
rushing down from the high plateau area (Ayres 1999: 63). Nevertheless, 
Mawson appreciated their situation, writing in his diary:  
“Life opens up to one as it must to the savage. Inside the Hut it is 20th Century 
civilization. What a contrast.” (Hains 2002: 21).  
 
Mawson was a man of great personal as well as physical strength. Hillary 
described his lone journey as “the greatest survival story in the history of 
exploration” (Turney 2012: 247). However, it was his day-to-day leadership style 
on which the success of the expedition depended. This was relaxed and 
egalitarian:  
“When eighteen men are herded together in a space twenty-four feet square for 
over a year, in a climate so severe that the greater part of the time must be spent 
indoors, and when those limited quarters must serve for sleeping, cooking, 
eating, and for the pursuit of many specialized callings, then indeed is the test of 
true comradeship.” (Laseron 1957: 3). 
 
That such men lived in harmony is also due to the skills of their leader. Being an 
exceptional organizer helped too (Riffenberg 2010: 423). Laseron writes of no 
serious quarrel or friction in that time and of the absence of social 
discrimination, as “no-one had secured his position by social or financial 
influence” (Laseron 1957: 4). The equal footing meant domestic chores were 
done by turns, including Mawson’s. His selection of men was clearly successful in 
terms of the way they operated as a team.  
       
Mawson’s was an authority earned by being a leader who worked alongside his 
men. A constant feature of his leadership was based on example. He worked “like 
a Trojan” erecting masts on Wireless Hill (Ayres 1999: 60) and dived in to six 
feet of freezing water in an attempt to retrieve a lost radio part (Laseron 1957: 
45).  However, he knew a degree of distance is necessary for successful 
leadership and Mawson achieved this by not participating in certain activities, 
such as singsongs, and tended to keep his anxieties to himself  
“Mawson, unlike Shackleton, was private and self-contained, radiating an 
existential autonomy, almost visibly repelling familiarity.” (Ayres 1999: 62). 
  
Called the Boss or D. I. (from Dux Ipse, the leader himself), he preserved a certain 
aloofness, with some of his men saying he was too distant to be loved and 
difficult to get to know or judge (Ayres 1999: 65).   
 
Expedition member Eric Webb recalled Mawson as 
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“an intellectual leader with utter motivation and selfless dedication to his 
objective which he handed out to all of us … so that, by common consent, it 
became accepted and promoted as the policy of the expedition” (Ayres 1999: 
64). 
Mawson achieved this through his high expectations and his own efficiency, 
character, expertise and hard work. He was concerned with the quality of 
expertise among his men and their technical mastery of survival requirements. A 
practical man who quested for improvement as well as being intellectual, he 
could get frustrated by the men’s lack of capacity (Hains 2002: 51-2). 
 
The crisis of Sidney Jeffryes’ insanity during the winter of 1912 caused Mawson 
to respond by asserting command. He made the decision to isolate the person 
whose madness might have contaminated the other members of the winter 
party. Resourceful under stress a good leader, thus, 
 “consolidates and stimulates a camaraderie, isolates the infection, prescribes a 
‘cure’, and guarantees the survival of the team. Harsh measures, harsh world.” 
(Ayres 1999: 92). 
 
Mawson was a man of very solid, conservative morals; a man of faith, who 
carried and read a small bible on his Far Eastern Sledging Journey and wrote in 
his diary he “felt grateful to Providence … who has so many times helped me” 
(Ayres 1999: 78-80). He was also a man capable of deep love, in his relationship 
with his wife Paquita (McEwin 2008). On a later expedition (1929-30) the 
animosity between Mawson and the captain of his ship (John King Davis) 
undermined his leadership and got the expedition off to a rough start. This 
continued throughout with the pair being reduced to communicating by notes 
(Ayres 1999: 188). However, this was much after the Heroic Age. 
 
In the end his life was one of dedication to the promotion of science and 
Antarctica, including protection of its wildlife. His “Herculean” efforts post-
expedition also evidenced his leadership qualities that had already been 




2.7 Scott, Amundsen and Shackleton 
 
Robert Falcon Scott (1868-1912) 
 
British National Antarctic Expedition 1901-04 (Discovery 
Expedition) 
British Antarctic Expedition 1910-13 (Terra Nova Expedition) 
 
Roald Amundsen (1872-1928) 
 
Norwegian Antarctic Expedition 1910-12 (Fram) 
 
Ernest Shackleton (1874-1922) 
 
British Antarctic Expedition 1907-09 (Nimrod Expedition) 
Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition 1914-16 (Endurance) 
Shackleton-Rowett Expedition 1921-22 
 
Much has been written about the three best known Heroic Age leaders, who have 
outshone other explorers to the extent they are largely forgotten or unknown.  
 
This section discusses the way heroic images have changed over the last century 
and introduces some contrasting aspects of Scott and Shackleton. This is 
followed by a brief outline of theirs and Amundsen’s personalities and leadership 
traits; they are discussed together on account of the interconnected nature of 
their expeditions, lives and heroic images.  
 
Proven as a competent leader, thorough planner and seasoned explorer, 
Amundsen had overwintered on Gerlache’s Belgica journey of 1897-99 and over 
three winters had lived and worked in the Arctic studying and experiencing 
survival tools. He had profound respect for the polar environment. He identified 
and looked to solve problems; before and during the journey to the South Pole he 
ruthlessly scrutinised and refined equipment, food and clothing. The Fram was a 
clean and comfortable ship, each man had his own small cabin and the food was 
excellent and nutritious. 
 
Amundsen still had some lessons to learn, however (McPhee 2011: 105). In 
jumping the gun in leaving too early on his journey to the South Pole he risked 
the lives of both men and dogs. This prompted Hjalmar Johansen, a member of 
the party, to say “I don’t call it an expedition. It’s panic” (Alexander 2011: 125). 
Amundsen’s resentment at being criticised subsequently cost Johansen a place 
on the Polar party. His management of his relationships with some of the men 
became increasingly poor (McPhee 2011: 144). 
 
Amundsen realised that success was the only thing that would justify his 
subterfuge in his decision to “head south” and race Scott to the Pole. His decision 
to turn back after the first attempt shows that Amundsen could moderate his 
ambition to not risk failure in attaining the ultimate prize. He was driven by the 
Norwegian tradition of very little tolerance for failure in expeditions (Alexander 
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2011: 134). This was in contrast to the British tradition that focused on the 
struggle, in which death, if it occurred, was heroic. 
 
We are reminded of Scott, Amundsen and Shackleton that “[a]ll three made 
deadly errors, had grave character flaws and, at some point in their careers, 
caused other men to die“ (Fiennes 2004: xiii). 
 
Shackleton’s epic journey of survival after the Endurance was crushed by pack 
ice is now legend. He had been a member of Scott’s Discovery Expedition in 
1901-04, setting a new furthest South record of 82°17’S but was invalided home 
after contracting scurvy. He led his own Nimrod Expedition in 1907-09 and 
reached a new record of 88°23’S, returning home a “splendid failure” (Heacox 
1999: 33).  
 
After the sinking of the Endurance on the Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition, 
Frank Worsley described the burden of leadership on Shackleton when the men 
had reached Elephant Island safely: 
 “it was evident that anxiety for his party rather than physical strain had 
exhausted him. And as we scrutinised each other in silence for a moment I 
realised as I think I had never done before what a great man he was. He was not 
only the leader of a great expedition but a true brother and shipmate to each one 
of us, thinking of us always before himself.” (Barczwski 2007: 203). 
 
Many of Shackleton’s examples of great leadership are taken from this voyage, 
from the time the Endurance was trapped until all men were rescued. He dealt 
with threats to his authority, rationed food, maintained morale, made life and 
death decisions and chose the right teams. Of the “heroes that history forgot” 
were the ten men of the Ross Sea party, dropped on the sea ice with the job of 
laying depots for Shackleton’s party as they came across the Pole from the 
Weddell Sea. They succeeded in laying the depots to supply the party crossing 
from the Weddell Sea in spite of quite desperate conditions. Only six men 
survived, an often unreported part of Shackleton’s rescue story of “all his men”;  
although he was to rescue them after the men on Elephant Island. It has been 
noted that the Ross Sea shore party were not adequately funded for what they 
had to do. Shackleton had little to do with their recruitment, sending them 
instructions in writing. Nevertheless, they were critical to the success of the 
expedition’s original plan. 
 
It has been said that Shackleton’s and Scott’s lives “cast a shadow across the 
other” (Heacox 1999: 42). Animosity, competition, criticism, irritation, suspicion, 
even mutual contempt at times marked the relationship (Barczewski 2007: 49-
53). We do know that Scott and Shackleton had much in common. Strong, 
ambitious characters; charming when they wished and stubborn when pushed, 
both hoped their Antarctic ventures would further their prospects. This 
description is shared by Huntford (1979) and Fiennes (2004), the two authors 
who did much, respectively, to damage and rehabilitate Scott’s reputation. 
 
Scott came from the well off circles of the middle classes and was the more 
reserved man, an experienced and capable naval officer with an aura of 
authority. The Discovery was a naval vessel; Terra Nova was an independent 
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merchant registered as a yacht of the Royal Yacht Squadron, which enabled the 
application of naval discipline, customs and hierarchies on board. Scott 
transferred these from ship to land, as a way of maintaining disciple and order: 
everyone knew their role (Scott’s Last Expedition 2013). He was not, however, 
inflexible, and was capable of emotion and sensitivity, evidenced by his feeling 
for animals. His humanity is most evident in his last diary entries. 
 
Shackleton on the other hand was Irish and from the merchant marine, not the 
same “officer class” as Scott as the merchant service had little social standing. He 
sought ways to distinguish himself: a man of less than impeccable reputation, he 
was known as a philanderer and for his dubious financial dealings (Barczewski 
2007: xvi; Ayres 1999: 45). In 1916 many saw him as “not quite trustworthy” 
(Barczewski 2007: xviii); as such, his archetype militated against a rise to heroic 
status, in both Britain and America. Not until the late twentieth century did he 
become the perfect leader, the “beau idéal of the heroic explorer” (Barczewski 
2007: xvi). 
 
Scott had a deep interest in science that Shackleton did not share. When 
Shackleton spoke to a journalist about the value of polar expeditions there was 
no mention of any scientific endeavour:  
”Surely everything that shows a nation what discipline will do, what leadership 
can effect and what difficulties may be overcome, and what hardships may be 
borne, everything that fires the blood of a boy, that quickens imagination, that 
makes for enterprise, audacity, forward-looking, hard living and moral 
steadfastness – surely that’s good.” (Barczewski 2007: 136). 
Yet he provides more balance when speaking to another journalist, about why he 
was drawn back to the Antarctic: 
“Men go out into the void spaces of the world for various reasons. Some are 
actuated simply by a love of adventure, some have the keen thirst for scientific 
knowledge, and others again are drawn away from the trodden paths by the 
“lure of little voices,” the mysterious fascination of the unknown. I think that in 
my case it was a combination of these factors that determined me to try my 
fortune once again in the frozen south.” (Turney 2012: 37). 
 
Scientific work was a strong feature of both Scott’s expeditions, reflecting the 
role of the Royal Geographical Society: it had been intimately involved in setting 
the science goals for the Discovery Expedition. Scott ensured this followed a 
unified programme of scientific work rather than individual experiments 
(Barczewski 2007: 30), aspects of which later were to receive some criticism. 
When preparing for the Terra Nova Expedition Scott argued for a specialist 
scientific team, the duty of an explorer being to do more than just record his 
movements. Suggestive of Nordenskjöld ‘s internationalist approach to science, in 
Scott’s words: 
 “he ‘must take every advantage of his unique position and opportunities to study 
natural phenomena, and to add to the edifice of knowledge those stones which 
can be quarried only in the regions he visits. Such a result cannot be achieved by 
a single individual or by a number of individuals trained on similar lines. The 
occasion calls for special knowledge and special training in many branches.’” 
(Turney 2012: 73). 
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The Terra Nova Expedition’s scientific programme at the time was one of the 
broadest and most extensive ever conducted in Antarctica. More than 80 people 
were involved in the expedition, including a team of scientists who studied 
geology and surveyed new terrain, collected a vast amount of zoological 
specimens and made meteorological observations. Results were published in 80 
individual reports produced by 59 different specialists: this was a significant and 
lasting contribution to the understanding of Antarctica. 
 
To his contemporaries, Scott had given his life in order to increase the world’s 
scientific and geographic knowledge; he had, moreover, refused to abandon his 
companions in the interest of his own survival (Barczewski 2007: 142). These 
were highly valued leadership traits of his time. Today Scott’s legacy, shared by 
other expedition leaders who made significant scientific contributions, was 
founding the principle that Antarctica was a continent for science. Half a century 
later it was to be protected for that purpose under the Antarctic Treaty. 
 
 
3 THE HEROIC AGE 
 
3.1  Experiences in the Antarctic environment  
 
An important context for understanding the requirements of leadership in heroic 
age exploration was the limited nature of the resources and knowledge available, 
along with the extremes of the polar environment. Antarctica is beautiful but one 
of the most hostile and unforgiving places on earth, where misjudgements and 
inexperience are fatal for humans. Amundsen himself had exclaimed: 
“The wilderness of the landscape is not to be described: chasm after chasm, 
crevasse after crevasse, with great blocks of ice scattered promiscuously about, 
gave one the impression that here nature was too powerful for us.” (Otway 
2011: 66). 
 
Thus, each expedition became a feat of endurance that tested the physical and 
mental limits of all members: 
 “The heroism came about as a by product of dealing with the hazards presented 
by penetrating the completely unknown and extremely hostile polar 
environments without the aid of maps or, in some cases, without any prior 
knowledge or experience of ice or polar conditions, something that would today 
be regarded as exceedingly foolhardy.” (Summerhayes 2008: 324). 
Antarctic expeditions were enormous operations and a great deal of planning 
was needed, including funding arrangements. Everything (including shelter) that 
was needed to live for a number of years had to be transported to Antarctica by 
ship. The Terra Nova took everything needed to live and work in Antarctica for 
three years. Examples of some food quantities alone included 1600kgs of 
pemmican, 1600kgs of concentrated lemon syrup, 2300kgs of sugar, 900kgs of 
milk powder and 680kgs of cocoa (Scott’s Last Expedition 2013). 
 
The journeys themselves were hazardous enough with overloaded ships sailing 
and steaming through the “roaring forties, furious fifties and screaming sixties”. 
Coal was the “sinews of the Expedition” (Charcot 1911: 21), which when 
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necessary was supplemented or replaced by seal blubber and even penguin oil 
for fuel. Drygalski, for instance, used penguin carcasses to feed the boilers of his 
ship. If marooned, men depended on food they could catch, had to build shelter 
and ward off despair. 
 
In Antarctica, every day problems in the early 20th century were ice and dangers, 
cold and the weather, frostbite and snow-blindness, hunger, scurvy, and 
psychological difficulties in an environment of “icy nihilism” (Elzinga 2006: 152). 
Symptoms of scurvy include swollen muscles, spongy gums and teeth loss, 
impaired vision, exhaustion and haemorrhaging. Vitamin C as a preventative was 
not scientifically evidenced until 1912, although some leaders had already 
established sound nutritional practice (notably Captain James Cook). Sledging 
journeys proved a risk with men relying on rations of pemmican and not fresh 
meat. Of the 4,500 calories required daily on an average sledging ration, 
approximately half is needed simply to maintain body heat and avoid 
hypothermia, when temperatures reach -40 C° (Schillat 2006: 172). A member of 
Scott’s Polar party in 1912, Petty Officer Edgar Evans succumbed to scurvy 
before the others and Solomon (2001: 230) attributes this to his distaste for seal 
meat in the months leading up to the journey. Charcot’s 1908 journey on the 
Français stocked a range of antiscorbutics “sufficient to save us from the scurvy 
that attacked the expeditions of old” (Charcot 1911: 20), although this was not 
always effective. Amundsen’s crew were fed fresh underdone seal meat, not a 
widely accepted means of preventing scurvy at the time yet successful. Men who 
did not eat seal meat, or enough of it, were likely to succumb to the disease.  
 
The five-month-long polar winter was another great challenge. Spirits were high 
and duties maintained during Nordenskjöld’s first winter, however, in the 
second, “nobody would even get out of their bunks for meal times. The mess 
room was too cold at times to sit down and eat” (Schillat 2006: 174). Blood 
mixed with flour and fried in seal blubber became a favourite meal. 
 
Charcot describes the effort involved in trying to do simple daily chores:  
“[h]ampered as we are by our gloves, if we take them off for a few seconds we 
burn our hands, benumbed by the metal, and the frozen canvas tears our nails. It 
took two of us to unfold the tent; it might have been made of steel. It was torture 
untying a knot with ungloved hands, hands that one could not feel at all, or felt 
far too much, dancing about the whole time to keep one’s feet warm, and every 
now and then breaking off the stalactites painfully attached to one’s moustache 
and continually dripping nose!” (Oulie 1938: 85). 
 
The expeditions moved on muscle power: of ponies, dogs and men. Despite all of 
this, on the attraction of polar regions Charcot wrote “once having left moral and 
physical fatigue are forgotten, and one’s only idea is to go back” (Oulie 1938: 96). 
Life in the uninsulated huts was more than tolerable, even during winter, if 
discipline and scientific routine were maintained. They were places of refuge and 
often camaraderie also: Scott’s Cape Evan’s hut was described as having a “club-
like atmosphere” (Reader’s Digest 1985: 192). Drygalski’s ship Gauss resembled 
“a cosy German hamlet in winter” (Reader’s Digest: 142). 
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Scott’s disaster overshadowed the significant achievements of other expeditions 
at the time and there were even less celebrated leaders who faced risks and 
survived the Antarctic environment. Their feats of epic endurance equalled those 
of well known leaders, and they deserve a mention in discussing endurance of 
hardship in the Antarctic environment. An example is the First Officer Victor 
Campbell who led the Northern Party in 1911. Unable to penetrate the pack ice 
48 kilometres from shore, the Terra Nova failed to pick them up from their depot 
at Evans Cove. Overwintering in an ice cave with minimal rations, the following 
spring they reached the safety of Cape Evans after a forty day march. 
  
Another example is Aeneas Mackintosh who led the already-mentioned Ross Sea 
Party in support of Shackleton’s Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition. Frank Wild 
also merits mention. He first went south with Scott and was to spent eight of the 
next fourteen years in the Antarctic region (Finkel 1976: 17). He was with 
Shackleton on his 1908-09 attempt to reach the South Pole and he was a member 
of Mawson’s expedition and led the party that overwintered on the Shackleton 
Ice Shelf in 1912. In 1916 he led the party left on Elephant Island for 105 days, 
awaiting Shackleton’s rescue. A man who “exercised a wonderful control 
without…outward sign of authority” (Heacox 1999:143), he treated the men with 
humanity and equality, kept them occupied and maintained the hope of 
Shackleton’s return. 
 
The conditions of Heroic Age expeditions show the extreme and relentless 
demands on their leaders. There were no holidays, no time off once the 
expedition had embarked. Mawson, for example, was criticised by the crew of the 
Aurora for his “weakness” in succumbing to sea-sickness on the journey to 
Antarctica. The leader was always on stage. 
 
3.2 The place of science 
 
A huge amount of science was done during the Heroic Age that laid the ground 
for modern Antarctic science, and the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty 50 
years later. Collectively, the effort was outstanding in achieving Sir Clements 
Markham’s 1895 challenge. The astounding research efforts of many expeditions 
reflect the fundamental place of science in Victorian and Edwardian British 
culture and that spread to Europe. Larson argues for the centrality of science to 
British efforts in Antarctica, among the military, commercial, ideological and 
personal motives (Larson 2011: ix). Scientific in design and execution, Scott’s 
first expedition was part of an international programme involving Germany 
(Drygalski) and Sweden (Nordenskjöld).  
 
Such a co-operative approach to research was before the race to the South Pole, 
with the years 1910-14 marking an escalation of straightforward rivalry with 
sharp national overtones (Elzinga et al 2004: 258). The Heroic Age was not a 
homogeneous period: either in motivation or in organisation and impact, given 
the knowledge the early explorers and scientists lacked about the continent and 
its conditions, which were to benefit later expeditions.  
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Just as today’s Antarctic community of interest remains small and tight-knit, that 
of the Heroic Age was even smaller, with the lives, interests and ambitions of 
these men often interconnected and their expeditions overlapping. Even so, they 
were all born of very different circumstances, cultures and with varying 
capabilities. Their leadership qualities and contribution extended in many 
instances well beyond their time on expedition. Not all contributed equally to the 
legacy of scientific knowledge that was a feature of the Heroic Age, however. 
Comparing the expeditions of Scott, Amundsen, Shackleton and Mawson, the 
polar historian J. Gordon Hayes wrote: 
 “Sir Douglas Mawson’s Expedition, judged by the magnitude of both its scale and 
of its achievements, was the greatest and most consummate expedition that ever 
sailed for Antarctica. The expeditions of Scott and Shackleton were great, and 
Amundsen’s venture was the finest Polar reconnaissance ever made; but each of 
these must yield the premier position, when fairly compared with Mawson’s 
magnificently conceived and executed scheme of exploration.” (Riffenburgh 
2010: 420). 
  
Shackleton balanced his goals in a different way from both Scott and Mawson. He 
was a man who “lived like a mighty rushing wind” (Reader’s Digest 1985: 309), 
who did not love science for its own sake, but 
 “… recognised science rather as a useful accessory to his own plans … Herein he 
differed from Scott, who was himself a scientist at heart and made notable 
personal contributions to glaciology. It is interesting to speculate how far 
geographical discovery was to Shackleton a means to an end – the end, the 
gratification of personal ambition” (Barczewski 2007:155). 
Unlike Scott, neither Shackleton nor Amundsen were devoted to scientific 
research, although Shackleton was “blessed with the inclusion of [the Professor] 
David and Mawson” (Riffenburgh 2010: 421). Comparing Shackleton to Mawson, 
Frank Hurley said:  
“Shackleton grafted science on to exploration – Mawson added exploring to 
science.” (Turney 2012: 258)  
 
Scott’s handwritten notes in “Southern Journey 1911-12”, 8 May 1911 explain 
why attaining the South Pole was so important: if they failed he believed their 
best scientific work would be neglected: 
 “The Southern Journey – this most important object of this expedition – that 
object is not only important in itself but in relation to all other objects. One 
cannot affect to be behind in this situation. The scientific public as well as the 
more general public will gauge the “result” of this scientific work of the 
expedition largely in accordance with the success or failure of the main object.” 





4.1 Heroic Images  
 
Scott is the archetype of a hero whose image has changed and changed again and 
opinions have been extreme and polarised. The portrayal of his leadership 
attributes and style over the century since his death in 1912 has moved from the 
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romantic, rose-tinted representation of the Heroic Age to Huntford’s harsh 
critique in 1979, comparing his capability as a leader so unfavourably with 
Amundsen’s. By the beginning of this century it has turned again, to a softer, 
more nuanced understanding that embraces cultural context and balances the 
driving motivations of science and the goal of the Pole (McTurk 2012). This 
contemporary view is more balanced, focusing on Scott the man and the wider 
context of his expeditions (Scott’s Last Expedition 2013).  
  
The nature of hero and image creation are essentially time-bound. Barczewski 
discusses the “malleability of heroism”(2007: xv) and argues that the respective 
images of Scott and Shackleton formed at the times of the deaths were 
determined by the Edwardian cultural values, but also very much shaped by the 
timing of their deaths in relation to the First World War. Ultimately, it was Scott’s 
story, and that of his polar party, that resonated better with the public’s need to 
comprehend death, over Shackleton’s miraculous rescue.  
 
Victorian values meant death in the service of one’s country was highly glorified 
and elaborately mourned, however, the Edwardian era saw a change in attitudes 
towards death. This further shifted as a result of the First World War. In the 
search for meaning in the 722,000 men killed in Britain alone, the deaths of Scott 
and his party gave a “new, more profound resonance for the millions of Britons 
seeking an explanation and solace for the deaths of their loved ones” 
(Barczewski 2007: 143). Kathleen Scott received numerous letters from men 
who said 
 “that they could never have faced without complaint the dangers and hardships 
of their service had they not learned to do so from [Scott’s] teaching” 
(Barczewski 2007: 141). 
 
Scott’s death suited the wartime context perfectly. Seen as “an exemplar of the 
kind of death [soldiers] should be suffering”, (Barczewski 2007: 140) this was 
proof that death had a meaning: 
“A polar hero could do nothing greater than die in his quest to give Britain 
geographical primacy.” (Barczewski 2007: 139). 
 
Shackleton, on the other hand, had not conveniently “accepted his fate as an 
exemplar of sacrifice” (Barczewski 2007: 144) and nor did he fit the British naval 
heroic tradition (a hero of the establishment) in the way that Scott did 
(Barczewski 2007: 115). By 1916 polar exploration was no longer a priority for 
the British public, and news of his survival was forced to compete with news 
from the front (the Battle of Jutland and progress on the Somme offensive) 
(Barczewski 2007: 132).  
 
It was not until Shackleton’s death in 1922, ten years after Scott’s, that he 
enjoyed similar media coverage, and in this he, too, achieved some semblance of 
the role of heroic martyr. That his epic rescue of all twenty-seven men was a 
much lesser story in 1916 reflects both the time and the already established role 
of Scott.  
 
Scott’s greater prominence in British culture as a hero following the First World 
War related to the British belief in exploration as a selfless, idealistic pursuit for 
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national good and that of humankind. In stark contrast was the quest for 
individual achievement and glory, associated with Amundsen and eliciting the 
remark “three cheers for the dogs”, implying that without which he would never 
have got to the Pole (Larson 2011: 24). To a lesser extent the public perceived 
Shackleton more in this mould than in Scott’s, despite there being little 
difference in their actual ambitions. Shackleton had been the subject of some 
criticism for not participating in the war effort, despite the Admiralty turning 
down his offer to not proceed with his expedition. Local sentiment about sending 
56 able-bodied men to explore rather than go to war was summed up: 
  “E ought ter ‘ave been at the war long ago instead of messing about on icebergs.” 
(Barczewski 2007: 135). 
 
Yet today the epic rescue is the defining story of Shackleton as a leader in the 
Heroic Age. Today’s cultural expectations mean Shackleton has become the hero, 
rather than Scott: now “the stiff and indecisive Scott lies in Shackleton’s towering 
shadow” (Jones 2003: 8). The conventional military heroism of Scott fell from 
favour during the growth of anti-establishment sentiment in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Vietnam War, the more democratic way of life and the rise of the 
individualist out of the ashes of a class-based society, all conspired to give 
Shackleton his day: 
“We live now amongst the rubble of a Victorian culture fractured by two world 
wars.” (Jones 2003: 292). 
 
Such an image reversal is culturally dependent and time-bound: another century 
or less is likely to see other turns of events. We necessarily view the Heroic Age 
leaders through the prism of history: the cultural, political and economic 
influences throughout the intervening time have all had their effect on the 
images of these men. We too are a part of history, not outside of it: today is 
simply tomorrow’s history. We, too, “see” through a particular lens or aperture, 
one dictated by the paradigm of our own time no less than the Edwardian view. 
 
4.2 The prism of history 
 
It is this that brings into question the description and interpretation of Heroic 
Age leaders in the management literature. Necessarily linked to today’s cultural 
paradigms and “what make a leader great” in the Western tradition of 
leadership, there is something rhetorical in their point of view. The evolution of 
images over time are a function of both the cultural climate in which the story of 
a “hero” is being told, and the opinions and attitudes of the person telling the 
story. Images shift in shape as these influencing factors change over time 
(Barczewski 2007: xv). 
 
Barczewski (2007) argues that the changing images of Scott and Shackleton 
occurred after their deaths and so it was not to do with their actual character or 
achievements. After all, “they are the same men” (Barczwski 2007: xviii). Rather, 
the changes have occurred as a result of our reassessment of information already 
known. While new information has come to light over the last century, our 
knowledge of these men is not significantly different than in 1916. What has 
 26 
changed their images over this time is our interpretations of these men, as a 
result of the world we live in today. 
 
This makes it challenging to succinctly describe the leadership characteristics of 
Scott, Amundsen and Shackleton, locked together as they are in the web of 
history: the race, their rivalries and with Scott and Shackleton, the reversals of 
their heroic status. The lesser known explorers have not been the subject of such 
differing interpretations over the years, so the facts as we know them from the 
Heroic Age are viewed through a less distorted lens. 
 
What we read and understand today have been refracted over time and through 
our own cultural context. Extending this metaphor, in viewing the past through 
the prism of history we see refracted light: the spectrum of different wavelengths 
is the political, economic and cultural influences over that time, affecting us and 
through our changing interpretations, the images themselves. To understand and 
appreciate the Heroic Age and its men we need to make sense of this rich 
complexity. If instead we put a filter before our eyes and look only through a 
small aperture, we see a blinkered view, a narrow interpretation that obscures 
the full context of this rainbow of colour. To understand the stories we need to 
remove any filters that act to distort our interpretation. 
 
The management books that use the Heroic Age leaders as “lessons” for modern 
business leaders take such a narrow and, hence, distorted view: they preclude 
full understanding by not viewing the full spectrum. Scott the bungler, 
Shackleton the saviour (or seducer, take your pick) and Amundsen the 
adventurer are but shallow epithets in the wider context of their lives, efforts 
and achievements. 
 
4.3 Heroic age leaders in management literature  
 
The Antarctic Heroic Age and its explorers, especially Scott, Amundsen and 
Shackleton, are being used to demonstrate “leadership lessons” to today’s 
managers in business and public service. These books are being promoted as 
both topical and relevant to twenty-first century leadership challenges. 
 
Such books fall broadly into two types. The first uses one leader to exemplify 
good characteristics of leadership that should be emulated in today’s business 
world to achieve success. Examples include Shackleton’s Way (Morrell and 
Capparell 2001), Leading at the Edge (Perkins 2000) and Shackleton: Leadership 
Lessons from Antarctica (Ainsberg 2009). Heroic Age leaders are not alone in this 
genre: it uses a wide range of characters. There is even a book on leadership 
lessons from Tony Soprano, the fictional Italian-American Mafia boss in the HBO 
television drama series The Sopranos (Schneider 2004). This too selects 
examples from his character and actions to illustrate the principles of leadership, 
adding “the sins of omission: what Tony Soprano does wrong”. 
 
The other type are those books that compare leaders, one against another or 
others: favorites are Scott and Amundsen, and Scott and Shackleton. An example 
is Great by Choice (Collins 2011); also McKay (2012) and Hansen (2011). This 
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genre of literature describes lessons that could be drawn from virtually 
anywhere where there were leaders to compare unfavourably: Adolf Hitler and 
Winston Churchill, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer and Chief Sitting Bull, or 
the ”deadly rivals” (Huntford 1997: 159) Fridtjof Nansen and Robert Peary.  
 
4.4 “Lessons from Shackleton” 
 
By comparing the examples of Shackleton-inspired principles with the general 
principles of leadership that prevail in the West today, we get some insight into 
what can be drawn legitimately from Heroic Age leaders. 
 
Shackleton’s leadership lessons according to Morrell and Capparell (2001) are: 
1. The path to leadership 
2. Hiring an outstanding crew 
3. Creating a spirit of camaraderie 
4. Getting the best from each individual 
5. Leading effectively in a crisis 
6. Forming teams for tough assignments 
7. Overcoming obstacles to reach a goal 
8. Leaving a legacy 
 
According to Ainsberg (2009) the ten leadership lessons from Shackleton are: 
1. Feel the purpose in your gut 
2. Choose a powerhouse for your number two 
3. Choose a cheerful, flexible team 
4. Create an optimal work environment 
5. Adapt confidently to setbacks and mistakes 
6. Keep dissidents close 
7. Respect the dignity of every individual 
8. Communicate! 
9. Balance work with joy 
10. It’s all about team-building 
 
The ten strategies for leadership according to Perkins (2000) are: 
1. Never lose sight of the ultimate goal, and focus energy on short-term 
objectives 
2. Set a personal example with visible, memorable symbols and behaviours 
3. Instill optimism and self-confidence, but stay grounded in reality 
4. Take care of yourself: maintain your stamina and let go of guilt 
5. Reinforce the team message constantly: “we are one – we live or die 
together” 
6. Minimize status differences and insist on courtesy and mutual respect 
7. Master conflict – deal with anger in small doses, engage dissidents, and 
avoid needless power struggles 
8. Find something to celebrate and something to laugh about 
9. Be willing to take the Big Risk 
10. Never give up- there’s always another move 
 
The leadership principles which are commonly identified in the management 
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literature of the Western world are generic and apply to all disciples: business, 
public service and the military.  There may be various lists or different groupings 
of headings and subheadings, but they are generally agreed as covering: 
1. Know yourself and seek self improvement 
2. Be technically proficient 
3. Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions 
4. Make sound and timely decisions 
5. Set the example 
6. Know your personnel and look out for their well being 
7. Keep your people informed 
8. Develop a sense of accountability, ownership and responsibility in your 
people. Develop a sense of responsibility in your followers 
9. Ensure each task is understood, supervised and accomplished 
10. Build a team 
(http://www.actioncoach.com/Ten-Principles-of-Leadership?pressid=665). 
These are often adapted and expressed in the context of an organization, for 
instance the Leadership Principles of ISS (Integrated Service Solutions) are that 
we put the customer first, have passion for performance, encourage innovation, 
treat people with respect, lead by example, lead by empowerment, develop 
ourselves and others, teamwork is at the heart of our performance and we are 
one company, one brand, one strategy 
(http://www.issworld.com/career/is_as_employer/pages/leadership_principles.aspx). 
  
The similarity is noticeable between the lessons we are to learn from Shackleton 
and the independent and already-known list in the core management literature. 
The Shackleton-inspired lists are simply different versions of today’s leadership 
principles: there is no material difference in the lessons from Shackleton. This 
suggests there is nothing special about this particular Heroic Age leader in terms 
of leadership lessons: he simply demonstrates them. The use of Shackleton’s 
character traits and actions to show “leadership in action” may be on point, both 
at the time and also today. Equally, other leaders of the Heroic Age could be used 
to exemplify some or all of these qualities, as the biographical outlines 
demonstrate.  
 
4.5 “Lessons from comparisons” 
 
Books comparing two (or more) leaders share the same characteristics as those 
of the first type just discussed, and in the case of Collins’ Great by Choice, also fall 
victim to the trap Huntford set in 1979 (Huntford 1979). In his book Scott and 
Amundsen, Huntford’s view of “Scott the bungler” was born: Scott as the bungling 
opposite to Amundsen, stupid, recklessly incompetent and irresponsible in the 
extreme, ultimately costing him and his teammates their lives. Huntford has been 
criticized for taking a less than rigorous approach in his debunking of Scott, 
which is a trap for those who uncritically use his material, as they inevitably 
import his bias. When debunking the accepted opinion on a matter,  
“the debunker’s scholarship must be not only as good as that of earlier 
biographers, but must be above reproach” (Young 1980). 
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Huntford’s book The Last Place on Earth (1999) is recommended reading and 
referred to by Collins as being “superb … a massive, well-written comparative 
study of these two men [Scott and Shackleton]” (Collins 2011: 14). This book is 
based on his earlier one, Scott and Amundsen (Huntford 1979) and his position 
vis à vis the protagonists does not change: 
“Since then, more material has emerged; little to make me revise my 
judgment, and much to reinforce it” (Huntford 1999: xxiii). 
 
Despite the date of Collins’ book being 2011, there is no mention of the raft of 
literature since 1979, including biographies, that refute Huntford’s reputational 
attack on Scott. These include Fuchs (1980), Solomon (2001), Jones (2003, 
2011), Fiennes (2004), Crane (2006) and May (2012). 
 
Collins takes Scott and Amundsen as a “near-perfect matched pair” (Collins 
2011: 13) and asks business managers “are you Amundsen or Scott?”. His “vivid 
analogy” is between the managers’ behaviours in response to a similar 
environment, and those of Amundsen and Scott to theirs on the race to the Pole. 
Ignoring differences in background, culture and expectations as well as the 
balance of their objectives, Collins unsurprisingly finds “Scott presents quite a 
contrast to Amundsen” (Collins 2011: 15). The race to the Pole is the only 
perspective taken and the men’s other experiences are seen exclusively in light 
of that end. Amundsen’s bicycling 2000 miles from Norway to Spain in 1899 is 
seen as part of his building a foundation for his quest: “Scott could have taken a 
thousand-mile bike ride. He did not.” (Collins 2011: 15). 
 
It is not that these two expedition leaders did not made mistakes, Scott especially 
since he is the one under fire from Collins. The point is that such a selective 
reading of Scott’s and Amundsen’s expeditions, indeed, their lives and historic 
contexts, will never give an informed picture. Collin’s comparison is not 
supported by the historic and academic research about Scott, and possibly also 
Amundsen. Instead, interpretations of Scott and Amundsen have been selected to 
give examples of established leadership principles. Examples of contemporary 
leaders would better serve this end and also avoid the risks associated with the 
prism of history. 
 
4.6 Leadership qualities of heroic age explorers 
 
Successful leadership of expeditions in extreme places such as Antarctica 
depends on the attributes of the leader and probably some good luck to boot. 
The question is whether there are common attributes among heroic age leaders, 
or whether they are unique to the circumstance: of the times, the man, the 
situation and the environment of Antarctica in the particular season and place. If 
there are particular and special attributes of leadership that are necessary for 
successful Antarctic expeditions, then comparisons between and among leaders 
might prove useful. If, however, there is no one style, and success depends on the 
man and the circumstances he finds himself in (for instance, some chose to lead 
expeditions, others were assigned and yet others paid), we might see a range of 
leadership features reflecting their different contexts: cultural, political, 
economic, physical, time, purpose and so on. 
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Drawing on the biographical outlines of the selected leaders in this paper and an 
interview with the social historian Ursula Rack (2013), a picture of their 
leadership qualities emerges. This demonstrates some common themes, 
however, this does not extend to a general pattern.  
 
Gerlache was a real pioneer in his exploration of Antarctic waters in the late 
nineteenth century. He lacked knowledge of the region, the conditions they 
might expect and the resources required to survive: nevertheless, they did 
return after expending huge effort to free the Belgica from the ice. By today’s 
qualities expected of leaders his decision-making style would be questioned, as 
he did not always involve others in his vision or plans. He was a naval officer not 
a scientist and had difficulties in his relationship with the scientists on the 
expedition, however, his overall commitment to scientific endeavor showed a 
different type of leadership, the expedition being hailed as a success despite their 
misfortunes. Account needs to be taken of his time and the fact that he was a 
Heroic Age explorer in the very beginning of that era. Over the next two decades 
the world was to change dramatically in terms of cultural and class values, 
scientific knowledge which was rapidly growing, and national interests. 
 
Drygalski was a both scientist and a good leader. He possessed authority in his 
scientific work and had a clear vision for his expedition and a respect for other 
disciplines. When choosing the expedition members Drygalski he was careful 
and made comments on each curriculum vitae, conducted interviews and entered 
into personal correspondence. Once selected, he involved people early in the 
preparation for the expedition and had a good interaction with them. One of the 
leadership lessons from Shackleton is his “hiring an outstanding crew” and 
Drygalski is also an impressive example. The following except from Hugh Mill in 
1905 describes this ability: of those mentioned, Ruser and Bidlingmaier both 
wrote of his good leadership and Drygalski and Gazert the physician were 
lifelong friends: 
“The scientific staff included as naturalist, Professor Vanhöffen, who had been 
with Drygalski on his Greenland expedition and also on the Valdivia; as surgeon, 
Dr. Hans Gazert; as geologist, Dr. Emil Philippi, who had spent some time with 
Sir John Murray in the study of deep-sea deposits; and as magnetician and 
meteorologist, Dr. Friedrich Bidlingmaier. The captain of the ship was under the 
instructions of Professor von Drygalski, as leader of the expedition; he was 
Captain Hans Ruser of the Hamburg-American line, and had accompanied the 
Valdivia as first officer on her short but brilliant cruise. The subordinate officers 
and crew were carefully chosen, and ultimately there were on board five 
members of the scientific staff, five officers, and twenty-two men. The scientific 
staff included as naturalist, Professor Vanhöffen, who had been with Drygalski 
on his Greenland expedition and also on the Valdivia; as surgeon, Dr. Hans 
Gazert; as geologist, Dr. Emil Philippi, who had spent some time with Sir John 
Murray in the study of deep-sea deposits; and as magnetician and meteorologist, 
Dr. Friedrich Bidlingmaier. The captain of the ship was under the instructions of 
Professor von Drygalski, as leader of the expedition; he was Captain Hans Ruser 
of the Hamburg-American line, and had accompanied the Valdivia as first officer 
on her short but brilliant cruise. The subordinate officers and crew were 
carefully chosen, and ultimately there were on board five members of the 
scientific staff, five officers, and twenty-two men.” (Mill 1905: Chapter XX). 
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Filchner never returned to Antarctica after his expedition but went on to achieve 
a lot in Asia (Filchner 1939). He had no influence in his expedition members: 
they were chosen by the “Antarktis Verein”, the committee responsible for its 
funding and organization. The ship Deutschland sailed under the German flag 
with the Captain Richard Vahsel. His illness exacerbated the already difficult 
relationship with Filchner, and with the lack of discipline regarding alcohol, this 
spread to damage relationships among the crew and scientists more widely, 
risking the expedition’s success.  
 
A pompous man, Filchner found it difficult to work with people of equal 
education and was very status oriented, liking order and hierarchy when he was 
an army commander and doing things by the book. He was rewarded by a 
message of thanks from the Führer in 1937. Yet he was also artistic. His 
leadership ability was not fully tested during his Antarctic expedition; however, 
his career in later life indicated he was not a natural leader. He spent it making 
detailed preparations for exploration of deserts, steppes and mountains of 
central Asia. He saw himself as a scientist who “emerges from the wilds” to 
associate with other scientists (Filchner 1939: 377).  
 
Charcot was a mariner and scientist and physician, probably in that order; a 
leader who got on well with his men. His expeditions were not government 
funded and he was dogged with bad luck with his ships, although despite this 
made a contribution to science and geographic exploration. He strongly 
promoted the co-operation between nations which was a hallmark of the 
expeditions of his time. He was not tested in the way some others were, 
nevertheless he can be said to be a leader in building camaraderie among his 
crew and for his significant scientific contribution. 
 
Nordenskjöld wanted to be part of the international co-operation of 1901-03 but 
struggled to get funding from the Swedish government. A scientist himself, he 
had friends among the scientists on his expedition, choosing to exercise his 
authority through his personal relationships with a few. He was not a strong 
leader and did not relate well to the lower ranks as Drygalski and Shackleton did. 
In some ways he too was not tested, being overwhelmed by the situation when 
three groups of his expedition were separately marooned. However, the teams 
he formed ultimately passed the test of these “tough assignments”, particularly 
Captain Carl Anton Larson, marooned on Paulet Island. 
 
Mawson had a very clear scientific programme and he made all the right contacts 
with scientists and between universities. Like Filchner and Shackleton, he had 
charm and charisma and used this to open purses and gain funding. He was in 
league with the European scientific community, and could push hard when 
required. Although not navy oriented or bound by that tradition he remained an 
aloof man. 
 
Controversy has arisen regarding his relationship with Mertz on account of the 
missing pages from Mertz’ diary. In a similar way to Scott with Petty Officer 
Edgar Evans and Captain Oates before their deaths, Mawson had made 
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dispassionate observations about the risk Mertz’ failing health posed to the lives 
of others (in this case himself). Yet Mawson cared for his people in a way 
Amundsen did not.  
 
Amundsen was also ruthless and while aware this was not the right way to think, 
considered those too weak did not deserve to live: “[c]ross him in any way and 
you would become superfluous, to be disposed of like any other form of offensive 
matter” (McPhee2010: 144). After Hjalmar Johansen challenged him after the 
first too early start to the Pole, he was never forgiven or spoken to without need 
(Reader’s Digest 1895: 189). Amundsen’s total focus on his goal reflected his 
newly independent country’s striving to show it could do the same as other 
nations. The issue of whaling rights and claims to territory in the sub-Antarctic 
islands were also in the mix. 
 
Scott led two very different expeditions and his leadership developed over this 
decade. Through trial and error much had been learnt between 1901 and 1911, 
however, there were only limited materials available at the time to respond to 
the requirements of the polar environment. Huntford in his book Scott and 
Amundsen (1979) mixed the two expeditions up in the examples he used to 
demonstrate “Scott the bungler”. However, the book caused people to look more 
closely at the expeditions, what had really occurred and why, such as Solomon 
(2001). It was the combination of a great many factors that made the difference 
between the two expeditions’ success, not simply the leadership strength or 
styles of Scott and Amundsen. 
 
Shackleton had a good feeling for people, was quite intuitive and emphasised 
their reliance on one another. He kept Hurley close to him because he was a 
strong character and potential troublemaker. Worsley was still the master of the 
ship yet Shackleton made the decisions in the background so Worsley would not 
lose the respect of his men. When it came to the epic survival story, 
circumstances that enabled their survival included Worsley’s navigational skills 
during the voyage in the James Caird and good enough weather to cross the 
mountains of South Georgia. Amundsen denied the role of luck in achieving 
success: 
“I may say that this is the greatest factor—the way in which the expedition is 
equipped—the way in which every difficulty is foreseen, and precautions taken 
for meeting or avoiding it. Victory awaits him who has everything in order — 
luck, people call it. Defeat is certain for him who has neglected to take the 
necessary precautions in time; this is called bad luck.” (Amundsen 1912). 
 
Barczewski (2007: 83) see it as an open question whether Scott’s mistakes, taken 
together, first cost him priority at the Pole, and second, caused the deaths of five 
men. Her point is that even if it did, it is not clear that this was  “an inordinate 
number of errors”: 
“as his and Amundsen’s expeditions were only the third and fourth ever to 
winter on the Antarctic continent; there was simply not enough data available 
for Scott to have prepared for every eventuality” (Barczewski 2007: 83). 
 
There is no doubt that many examples from Shackleton’s expeditions can be 
found to exemplify the principles of leadership today. This section illustrates that 
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some if not all of these principles are also found in some other leaders of the 
Heroic Age. Each leader excelled at some but was maybe less capable in other 
areas, including Shackleton. Charcot created a spirit of camaraderie, Drygalski 
hired an outstanding crew, Mawson organized an outstanding expedition and led 
by example, Scott and Mawson left a huge scientific legacy and so on. In fact all of 
them left a legacy: some by contributing to the growing body of scientific 
knowledge, Amundsen and others by reaching new places or mapping unknown 
territory. It is this diversity which means a particular leader cannot be used to 
provide “lessons from Antarctica” (Ainsberg 2009). If it did we could talk of 
“lessons from Rome” from Julius Caesar; Abraham Lincoln providing “lessons 
from America”; Nelson Mandela providing “lessons from prison” and so on: 
clearly absurd. 
 
To take the further step and compare these leaders is to assume that leadership 
is generic, whereas it can depend on the perspective, the point of view taken, as 
well as the character of the person. By taking the human view, the view of the 
scientific programme or that of managing and organizing an expedition, a 
different pattern of who exemplified good leadership would emerge. 
Generalising in history is always dangerous (Rack 2013). 
 
Shackleton and Amundsen were not recognized like Scott, Mawson, Drygalski, 
Nordenskjöld, Charcot, Gerlache and even Filchner, for their scientific method or 
contribution in that field. Amundsen was instead regarded highly for his speed 
and efficiency and Shackleton for his concern for his men and their rescue 
against all odds. Cherry-Garrard gives some perspectives that show the breadth 
of leadership qualities during the Heroic Age: 
"... For a joint scientific and geographical piece of organization, give me Scott; for 
a Winter Journey, Wilson; for a dash to the Pole and nothing else, Amundsen: 
and if I am in the devil of a hole and want to get out of it, give me Shackleton 





The conclusions in this paper are suggested and illustrated rather than proven. 
They provide themes that may be further developed and show the difficulties in 
comparing leaders of the Heroic Age. 
 
The evolution of heroic images over time are a function of both the cultural 
climate in which the story of the hero is being told and the opinions and attitudes 
of the person telling the story. As these change over time, so the images change.  
This is equally true of the way we view leadership qualities, which should be 
considered against both the context of history and the current paradigm, if we 
are to learn from them. Of Scott and Shackleton, Barczewski concludes: 
“[i]n reality it is impossible to compare the accomplishments of the two 
men, for they occurred in different places and in very different 
circumstances” (2007: xix). 
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There are no general characteristics of leadership in the Heroic Age shared by all 
leaders, although there are common themes. This is a fundamental problem if 
you are trying to draw leadership lessons, unless it is from one particular leader 
only. The current management literature that promotes leadership lessons from 
Scott, Amundsen and Shackleton as relevant to business management may not 
have validity and lacks any materially new information. This is because these do 
not provide “lessons” regarding leadership principles, only examples of already 
established ones that are exemplified by many people during the Heroic Age, 
indeed, throughout history. 
 
When we understand the drivers and expectations of the Heroic Age expedition 
leaders, appreciate the privations endured and their courage and stamina, both 
physical and psychological, to achieve what they did and the contribution they 
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